The rapid evolution of tokenized assets, stablecoins, programmable money and agentic digital infrastructure represents one of the most profound transformations in global finance since the advent of electronic payments. Inspired by this, a friend (given to a colourful metaphor) recently commented that those who wish to succeed in the new world must “mate with the T-Rex or be devoured as its lunch.” In this emerging landscape, the US (aka T-Rex) stands poised to extend its longstanding dominance in capital markets, payment systems and reserve currency status into the digital realm. For the UK and the European Union, adapting to this reality demands a clear-eyed assessment of historical precedents, resource asymmetries and pragmatic strategic choices. Rather than pursuing (futile) attempts at independent global competition, Britain and Europe should pursue structured partnership with the agentic USD, effectively “mating with the T-REX” to secure national interests whilst harnessing unparalleled American scale and liquidity.
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This approach draws inspiration from France’s successful co-branding experience with Cartes Bancaires, now accepted by one million merchants and 46,000 ATMs. Whilst recognising the limitations of purely national technological exports, it acknowledges the near-inevitable ascendancy of the agentic US dollar as the dominant unit of account and settlement mechanism in tokenized markets. By embracing this trajectory through a double-backed sovereign framework, the UK and its European partners can transform potential displacement into collaborative advantage, preserving monetary sovereignty whilst participating at the forefront of future finance.
Historical lessons in payment infrastructure and resource asymmetry
The establishment of global payment networks has historically required immense resources, sustained investment and coordinated institutional support over decades. The Visa network, launched in 1958 as BankAmericard, exemplifies this reality. Over subsequent years, it demanded continuous capital deployment, technological innovation, international negotiations and the cultivation of network effects that few sovereign states could replicate independently. The scale of American financial markets, combined with the dollar’s reserve currency role, provided the foundation for Visa’s global reach. Today, 95 percent of card transactions in the UK rely on Visa or Mastercard, which is one reason UK banks are now exploring an alternative system. A significant proportion of international card transactions, including approximately 95 percent of those in the UK, continue to rely on such US-originated rails.
Most nations (including the UK), lack the fiscal capacity, market depth and institutional coordination to construct equivalent global infrastructure from first principles. Attempts to build rival systems face prohibitive costs and the challenge of overcoming established network effects. France’s experience with Cartes Bancaires illustrates a more viable path. Introduced in the 1980s, this domestic payment system allowed French merchants and banks to offer both the national network and American counterparts simultaneously. Through co-branding, France leveraged the global acceptance and branding power of US systems whilst retaining meaningful domestic control and economic participation. This hybrid model delivered tangible benefits to French consumers and institutions without requiring the recreation of an entirely independent global network. Nevertheless, France’s broader record in exporting nationwide technological systems underscores the difficulties involved. The Minitel platform, launched in the early 1980s, but then shut down by the French government in 2012, achieved remarkable domestic penetration in France, providing online services, information access, and transactional capabilities well before the widespread adoption of the internet. Despite its technical success and widespread usage within the country, France struggled to market and adapt Minitel internationally. Limited expertise in global commercialisation, combined with cultural and regulatory barriers, confined its impact largely to the domestic sphere. This precedent carries direct relevance for current discussions on digital finance: Whilst national innovation can flourish internally, exporting or displacing entrenched global standards remains exceptionally challenging. These historical patterns inform the contemporary strategic environment. The UK possesses notable strengths, including English law, a deep talent pool in fintech, and London’s established position as a financial centre. However, these assets do not alter the fundamental resource asymmetry favouring the US in building and scaling agentic digital infrastructure. The UK cannot realistically marshal the decades-long commitment and capital deployment that enabled Mastercard and Visa’s dominance. Recognising this limitation is not defeatism, but the foundation of sound policymaking.
The inevitability of agentic USD dominance
The agentic USD - a programmable, intelligent and tokenized iteration of the dollar capable of automated execution, real-time settlement and integration with artificial intelligence systems - is rapidly emerging as the preferred unit of account for tokenized assets. Stablecoins denominated in US dollars already dominate global usage, facilitating cross-border payments, collateral movement and settlement in emerging digital markets. As generational wealth transfers accelerate, with projections exceeding $124 trillion over the coming decades, digital-native investors will increasingly demand 24/7 liquidity, fractional ownership, instant settlement and seamless interfaces. These preferences align naturally with platforms built upon agentic USD infrastructure it is unrealistic to expect the British pound or the Euro to displace this momentum. Network effects in payment and capital markets are self-reinforcing first-mover advantage: greater liquidity attracts more participants, which in turn deepens liquidity. The US benefits from deep Treasury markets, sophisticated financial institutions and regulatory developments that increasingly accommodate tokenized securities and programmable money. Attempts by the UK or the European Union to construct fully independent alternatives risk replicating the Minitel experience, technical competence domestically accompanied by marginal international influence.
Resistance or prolonged hesitation would likely accelerate capital migration, talent outflow and lost innovation opportunities. European and British markets could find themselves relegated to secondary status, accessing tokenized assets and digital opportunities primarily on terms dictated by US-centric platforms. Geopolitical considerations further complicate independent strategies. Reliance on foreign payment rails has already exposed vulnerabilities, as demonstrated by sanctions regimes and statements from European authorities emphasising the need for strategic autonomy in payments. Extending such dependence into tokenized capital markets without structured safeguards would compound these risks. In this context, the prudent response is not confrontation, but pragmatic accommodation. Partnering strategically with the agentic US dollar, offers a pathway that acknowledges power realities while extracting maximum national benefit. This mirrors France’s Cartes Bancaires approach but elevates it for the digital era through innovative sovereign backing mechanisms.
The double-backed agentic USD framework
The proposed model integrates the agentic USD as the primary unit of account and settlement rail for tokenized finance whilst embedding robust safeguards for national sovereignty. At its core lies a double-backing structure. The base layer remains anchored to US Treasuries, preserving the global credibility, stability and convertibility that underpin dollar dominance. A national tranche, managed by each participating country’s central bank and treasury, would be additionally backed by domestic real assets and real estate under direct sovereign control. This dual-collateral approach enables each nation to utilise the agentic US dollar in an “agentic” manner, programmable, automated and responsive to domestic policy priorities, whilst retaining control over its portion of the money supply. For example, the UK could direct its national component toward supporting infrastructure projects, housing finance or targeted economic stimulus through programmable features. Similarly, European partners could tailor their tranches to align with regional objectives such as green investment or small and medium-sized enterprise financing. Such a framework transforms the agentic US dollar from a potential instrument of displacement into a vehicle for sovereign participation. Countries gain immediate access to superior liquidity, technological infrastructure and network effects without bearing the prohibitive costs of independent global system development. Interoperability with existing GBP and EUR systems during a transitional period would further ease adoption, allowing co-branding akin to the French model. This structure effectively creates a hybrid sovereign dollar that combines American global scale with national asset control.
Detailed policy recommendations and implementation pathways
To translate this vision into practice, several coordinated actions are required across legislative, regulatory and diplomatic fronts. First, the UK and European Union should establish clear legal and regulatory frameworks for double-backed agentic stablecoins. This would involve recognising dual-collateral structures in primary legislation, defining rigorous standards for national asset valuation and backing, and ensuring robust oversight by domestic authorities such as the Bank of England and national treasuries. Regulatory sandboxes should be expanded and accelerated to test programmable features, hybrid settlement models and cross-border interoperability. Second, financial institutions should be encouraged, through incentives and guidance, to implement co-branding arrangements. Banks, payment providers and exchanges could offer agentic US dollar rails alongside traditional domestic systems, providing merchants and consumers with seamless choice while building familiarity with the new infrastructure. This mirrors the Cartes Bancaires precedent and minimises disruption during transition. Third, capital markets legislation must be modernised with urgency. Updates to prospectus rules, custody requirements, market infrastructure regulations and settlement protocols should integrate natively with agentic US dollar systems. Tokenized fund issuance and digital securities should receive expedited approval pathways, supported by principles-based regulation that balances innovation with consumer protection. Bilateral and multilateral agreements with US authorities would formalise the partnership. These should address collateral recognition, dispute resolution mechanisms, data standards, privacy safeguards and protocols for sovereign participation. Co-ordination with the European Central Bank and national treasuries would ensure alignment across jurisdictions while respecting varying national priorities. The UK, leveraging its post-Brexit regulatory agility, could lead in developing model agreements that other European partners might adopt.
Economic and geopolitical benefits of strategic partnership
Adopting this strategy would yield substantial economic advantages. The UK and Europe would position themselves as active participants in the tokenized economy rather than peripheral observers. Enhanced liquidity, reduced settlement times and programmable functionality would lower transaction costs, improve capital allocation efficiency and support broader economic growth. Financial institutions could develop innovative products built upon agentic US dollar rails whilst maintaining national branding and control over domestic tranches, thereby retaining economic value within their jurisdictions. From a geopolitical perspective, structured partnership mitigates risks of exclusion and enhances strategic autonomy in practice. By contributing national assets as collateral, participating countries enhance the overall resilience and diversification of the agentic US dollar ecosystem, creating mutual benefits with the US. This collaborative model reduces vulnerabilities associated with pure dependence and avoid the high costs and probable failure of fully independent systems. Risks of non-participation are significant and compounding. Delayed action could result in accelerated brain drain of fintech talent, reduced attractiveness of London and European financial centres and diminished influence in shaping global digital finance norms. Generational shifts amplify these stakes: younger investors, accustomed to digital interfaces and instant execution, will naturally gravitate toward the most advanced and liquid platforms, potentially directing future wealth flows away from UK and European markets.
Addressing potential concerns and safeguards
Critics may raise concerns regarding sovereignty or over-reliance on US infrastructure. The double-backing mechanism directly addresses these by ensuring national control over asset collateral, money supply tranches, and programmable features. Domestic regulatory approval would govern the deployment of national tranches, preserving policy autonomy in areas such as monetary calibration and economic stimulus. Transparency and accountability mechanisms should be embedded from the outset, including regular independent audits of collateral backing, public reporting on issuance volumes and usage and oversight by parliamentary or legislative bodies. Technical safeguards, such as ring-fenced national ledgers and programmable governance rules, can further protect against external interference. Legal agreements should include clear exit provisions and dispute resolution frameworks to safeguard long-term national interests. This balanced approach does not entail the surrender of sovereignty, but rather its intelligent exercise within the constraints of global financial realities.
Conclusion: intelligent adaptation in an era of asymmetry
The era of tokenized and agentic finance presents both opportunities and imperatives. Historical evidence, from Visa’s global expansion beginning in 1958 to France’s Cartes Bancaires success and Minitel’s international limitations, demonstrates the challenges of independent competition against entrenched network effects and resource advantages. For the UK and Europe, joining with the US through a double-backed agentic USD framework offers a realistic and advantageous path forward.
This strategy represents sophisticated adaptation; it leverages American scale whilst safeguarding national interests through sovereign backing and control. By acting decisively, establishing enabling frameworks, fostering co-branding, pursuing international agreements and modernising regulation, Britain and its European partners can secure meaningful participation in the future of finance. The alternative, prolonged resistance or isolated initiatives, risks marginalisation in an increasingly interconnected digital economy where the agentic USD is set to define the primary unit of account.
The time for consultation must give way to execution. Embracing this pragmatic partnership will ensure that the UK and Europe emerge not as bystanders, but as active beneficiaries in the agentic era of global finance. Through structured cooperation, they can protect sovereignty, foster innovation and deliver prosperity for current and future generations in a landscape defined by powerful network effects and technological asymmetry.
This article first appeared in Digital Bytes (5th of May, 2026), a weekly newsletter by Jonny Fry of Team Blockchain.